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Abstract 
This paper develops a simple model to analyze the effects of mergers in 
complementary system markets when the merged firm is able to engage in bundling.  In the 
short-run analysis, I analyze the impact of (mixed) bundling on pricing decisions for 
existing generations of products.  The basic model is then extended to analyze industry 
dynamics where the implications of mergers for innovation incentives and technical 
tying/compatibility decisions are explored.  Welfare implications of mergers in the short- 
and long-run will be also analyzed. 
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I. Introduction 
On July 3, 2001, in one of its most high-profile antitrust decisions ever, the 
European Commission blocked the proposed merger (valued at $43 billion) between 
General Electric and Honeywell. Since it is the first case in which a proposed merger 
between two U.S. companies that had been approved by Washington has been blocked by 
European regulators, the decision has been closely scrutinized.1  One of the main issues 
raised by the proposed GE/Honeywell merger concerned the possibility of “bundling” and 
its likely impact on competition in the markets for jet aircraft engines and avionics.2  The 
decision, however, has been criticized by many commentators for the alleged lack of sound 
economic models to support.   
This paper develops a model to analyze the effects of mergers in complementary 
system markets when the merged firm is able to engage in bundling.  The model builds on 
the framework developed by Economides and Salop (1992).  They analyze a model of 
competition with complementary products in which they derive equilibrium prices for a 
variety of organizational and market structures that differ in their degree of competition and 
integration.  However, they limit the strategy space of the merged entity and do not consider 
the possibility of bundling which is made possible due to the merger. 
There are essentially two forms of bundling in which the merged entity could 
potentially engage: 
 Under ‘mixed bundling’, the firm sells the individual components separately as well 
as selling the bundle (but the bundle is offered at a discount to the sum of the stand-
alone prices).  
 Under ‘pure bundling’, the firm only sells the bundle and it does not make the 
individual components available separately.   
                                                 
1 As of this writing, the case is under appeal in the Court of First Instance of the European Union. 
2 Another main issue that proved to be the stumbling block in the remedy negotiations between the merging 
parties and the Commission was the role and competitive implications of GECAS, GE’s aircraft leasing and 
financing arm.  
    3
The paper has two primary components – short-run and long-run analyses – since the form 
of bundling undertaken by the merged entity might be expected to differ over time for the 
following reasons:  
 For existing generations of products, the potential for the merged firm to engage in 
pure bundling may be limited.   
 For new generations of products with R&D, one might expect the merged firm to 
engage increasingly in pure bundling. This pure bundling could take the form of 
‘technical tying’, whereby the merged firm would make its products available only as an 
integrated system, making them incompatible with the individual components offered by 
independent suppliers. 
Much of the existing academic literature on bundling focuses on “pure bundling” 
[see, for instance, Whinston (1990), Carbajo, de Meza, and Seidman (1990), and Choi and 
Stefanadis (2001)].3  In the short-run, however, the merged entity, however, is expected to 
engage in “mixed bundling,” continuing to sell the individual components separately but 
selling them more cheaply as a bundle.4    
Thus, this paper develops a model of mergers that allows mixed bundling.  In 
particular, I show that when the merging firms bundle their complementary products, the 
short-run effects on pricing, market shares, and profits in the industry are as follows: 
1. The merged firm will reduce the price of its bundled system and expand market share 
relative to the situation prior to the merger. Prior to the merger, any price cut by one of the 
merging firms will tend to benefit the other’s sales. In the absence of the merger, neither 
party will take account of this benefit of a price cut on the other’s sales. Following the 
merger, however, the merged entity can “internalize” these “pricing externalities” arising 
                                                 
3 In a model of strategic market foreclosure of tying, for instance, Whinston (1990) shows that mixed bundling 
is not a useful strategy.   Thus, the motivation for mixed bundling is often found in the monopolistic bundling 
literature as a price discrimination device.  See Adams and Yellen (1976) and McAfee, McMillan, and 
Whinston (1989). 
4 As will be seen later, the incentive to practice mixed bundling rather than pure bundling in the short-run is 
confirmed in my model. 
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from the complementarity of their components by reducing the price of the bundle to below 
the level the two players would choose if acting independently.5  This will expand the 
merged firm’s sales and market share. 
2. The merged firm will raise the prices of its stand-alone components, relative to their 
levels prior to the merger.  The merged firm has less to lose from raising its stand-alone 
prices because a proportion of those customers that switch away from the stand-alone 
components as a result of the price increase will simply switch to the bundle offered by the 
merged firm rather than to the competing system. As such, the merged party will have an 
increased incentive to set high prices for its components. This raises the price of “mix-and-
match” systems (i.e. systems including a component of the merged firm alongside a 
competitor’s component) and makes them less attractive to buyers. 
3. Independent rivals selling single components reduce their prices in response but fail to 
recapture all market shares.  In response to the price cut by the merged firm for their 
bundled system and the price increase for the ‘mix-and-match' systems, the independent 
rivals will cut price in order to retain some market share. However, they will not cut their 
prices as much as the merged firm (i.e. their system will remain more expensive than the 
bundled system of the merged firm) since – in the absence of counter-merger - they cannot 
internalize the externality arising from the complementarity of their components. As a 
result, they will fail to recapture all of their prior market shares.  The merger would 
therefore reduce the profits of the merged firm’s competitors. This reduction in profits 
follows directly from the combination of a loss of market share and the need to cut prices.  
Thus, there is a distinct possibility of exit by outside rival firms.  
 Bundling in my model entails both pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects.  
There is no clear-cut answer to how mixed bundling by the merging parties would affect 
consumer and social welfare.  With heterogeneous consumer preferences, some buyers gain 
                                                 
5 Cournot (1838) is the first one to note that mergers among complements reduce prices.  He considered the 
merger of two monopolists that produce complementary goods (zinc and copper) that are used as inputs for a 
final good (brass).  My model extends his analysis to a case where both input producers face oligopolistic 
competition. 
    5
and others lose.  For instance, those who previously purchased both products from the two 
merging firms would gain due to the lower bundle price.   However, those who continue to 
purchase a mix and match system would suffer due to the increased stand-alone prices 
charged by the merged firm.  As a result, the overall impact on consumer and social welfare 
is ambiguous.  Numerical simulation results, however, suggest that the overall effects of 
such a merger would be welfare-reducing if the substitution between systems were 
sufficiently price-sensitive. 
In the long-run analysis, I consider the effects of mergers on R&D incentives.  It is 
shown that the merging firms’ R&D incentives increase at the expense of the rival firms’.  
The intuition for this result is the appropriability of the innovation benefit.  Mergers with 
bundling allow the merged entity to capture a larger market share in the systems market.  
This implies that any cost reduction from an innovation translates into a larger profit with 
merged firms.  This leads to more aggressive R&D investment. For the same reason, 
mergers with bundling dull the R&D incentives of outside rival firms.  Finally, I also 
consider the possibility of technical tying for new generations of products and show that it 
can be an effective strategy for the exclusion of rivals. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way.  Section II sets up the basic 
model and conducts a short-run analysis investigating the effects of mergers with mixed 
bundling on pricing decisions.  Section III deals with dynamic issues in the industry by 
extending the model to allow for R&D opportunities and technical tying.  Welfare 
implications of mergers in the short- and long-run will be also analysed in sections 2 and 3, 
respectively.   Section IV concludes. 
 
II. A Model of Mergers with Mixed Bundling  
Consider two complementary components, A and B, which are valuable only when 
used together.  Customers combine A and B in fixed proportions on a one-to-one basis to 
form a final product.  For instance, I can consider A and B as operating systems and 
application software, respectively, for computer, or cable/satellite service and content 
providers, respectively, to provide entertainment.  In the case of the proposed 
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GE/Honeywell merger, they correspond to engines and avionics, respectively, to form an 
aircraft.   
There are two differentiated brands of each of the two components A (A1 and A2) 
and B (B1 and B2).  Consequently, there are four ways to form a composite product, A1B1, 
A1B2, A2B1, A2B2.  Let the price of brand Ai be pi and the price of brand Bj be qj, where 
i=1,2 and j=1,2.   Then, the composite product AiBj is available at the total system price of sij 
= pi + qj.  Let Dij denote demand for the composite product AiBj.   The combinations of 
products and suppliers in this stylized model result in four possible systems, as shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Diagrammatic representation of the pre-merger situation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As in Economides and Salop (1992), I assume that the four potential composite 
goods are substitutes for one another: Dij is decreasing in its own price and increasing in the 
prices of the three substitute composite goods.  For instance, D11 is decreasing in s11, and 
increasing in s12, s21, and s22.   I can derive the demand functions for the components from 
A1 
 
A2 
 
B1 
 
B2 
 
p 1 
q 1 
p 2 
q 2
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the demand functions for the composite goods.   For instance, component Ai is sold as a part 
of composite goods AiB1 and AiB2.  Thus, the demand for component Ai is given by 
DAi = Di1 + Di2 
Similarly, the demand for component Bj is given by 
DBj =D1j +D2j 
I assume demand functions are linear and the demand system is symmetric: 
D11(s11, s12, s21, s22 )  = a –b s11+ c s12+d s21+ e s22 
D12(s12, s11, s22, s21 )  = a –b s12+ c s11+d s22+ e s21 
D21(s21, s22, s11, s12 )  = a –b s21+ c s22+d s11+ e s12 
D22(s22, s21, s12, s11 )  = a –b s22+ c s21+d s12+ e s11, where a, b, c, d, e>0. 
I also assume that b> c+ d+ e to ensure that composite goods are gross substitutes, i.e., an 
equal increase in the prices of all composite goods reduces the demand of each composite 
good.  To illustrate the effects of the merger, I further simplify the analysis by assuming that 
all four composite products are equally substitutable, that is, c=d=e with the parameter 
restriction of b>3c.  Without loss of generality, I assume that constant unit production costs 
are zero.6   The “a” parameter then represents the basic level of demand that would exist for 
each system if the per unit margins on each system were zero. The “b” parameter describes 
how demand for a given system falls as its own price increases (i.e. it reflects the own-price 
elasticity of demand for that system). The  “c” parameter describes how demand for a given 
system rises as the prices of its competitors increase (i.e. it reflects the cross-price elasticity 
of demand across systems).  I now analyze how the market equilibrium changes depending 
on the market structure.   
 
II.1. Pre-merger situation 
As a benchmark, I consider the case where all component brands Ai and Bj are 
independently owned implying there are four separate firms.  This case is analyzed in 
Economides and Salop (1992) and describes the situation before a merger. Let p1,  p2 , q1, 
                                                 
6 If there are positive constant unit production costs, the prices in the model can be interpreted as per unit 
margins. 
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and q2 denote the prices set by firms A1, A2, B1, and B2, respectively.  Then I can write 
each firm’s profit as: 
ΠA1 = p1 (D11+D12); ΠA2  = p2 (D21+D22); ΠB1 = q1 (D11+D21); ΠB2  = q2 (D12+D22) 
where:  
D11   = a –b (p1 + q1 )+ c (p1 + q2 )+c (p2 + q1 )+ c (p2 + q2 ) 
D12  = a –b (p1 + q2 )+ c (p1 + q1 )+ c (p2 + q2 )+ c (p2 + q1 ) 
D21 = a –b (p2 + q1 )+ c (p2 + q2 )+ c (p1 + q1 )+  c (p1 + q2 ) 
D22 = a –b (p2 + q2 )+ c (p2 + q1 )+ c (p1 + q2 ) + c (p1 + q1 )  
The market equilibrium (Nash equilibrium prices) is characterized by the following first-
order conditions: 
 ∂ΠA1 /∂ p1 = 2a –  4(b - c) p1 + 4c p2 – (b - 3c) q1 – (b - 3c) q2 = 0 
∂ΠB1 /∂ q1  = 2a – (b - 3c) p1 –  (b - 3c) p2 – 4(b - c) q1 + 4c q2 = 0 
∂ΠA2/∂ p2 = 2a + 4 c p1 – 4(b - c) p2 (b – 3c) q1 (b - 3c) q2 = 0 
∂ΠB2/∂ q2 = 2a - (b - 3c)  p1  – (b - 3c) p2 + 4 c q1  – 4(b - c) q2 = 0 
The equilibrium prices under this regime ( Ip1 ,
Ip2 ,
Iq1 ,
Iq2 ), where superscript I denotes 
Independent Ownership (i.e. the pre-merger situation)) are given as follows:  
 Ip1 =
Ip2 =
Iq1 =
Iq2 = )73( cb
a
−
 
Thus, the total system price of each composite good is given by:  
sij = Iip +
I
jq = )73(
2
cb
a
−
, where i, j = 1,2. 
With the symmetry of the model, all four systems (A1B1, A1B2, A2B1, A2B2) have the same 
market share of ¼ in the systems market by substituting the equilibrium prices back into the 
demand function: 
D11   = D12 = D21 = D22 = 
2
2 2
( )
3 9 4
a b c
b bc c
−
− +
     
Thus, each firm has the same market share of ½ with demand of 
2
2 2
2 ( )
3 9 4
a b c
b bc c
−
− +
in the 
relevant stand-alone markets.  Each firm’s profit in turn can be derived as: 
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 ΠA1 = ΠA2  = ΠB1 = ΠB2  = 
2
2
2 ( )
(3 7 )
a b c
b c
−
−
  
 
II.2. Merger between A1 and B1 with Mixed Bundling 
Now suppose that A1 and B1 merge.  As a merged entity, A1-B1 can offer three 
prices, s for the bundled product (A1B1) and 1~p  and 1~q  for individual components A1 and 
B1, respectively.  A2 and B2 remain independent and charge prices 2~p  and 2~q , respectively.  
Figure 2 describes the post-merger situation with mixed bundling. 
 
 
Figure 2: Diagrammatic representation of post -merger with mixed bundling 
 
( Ip1 < 1~p ) 
( Ip1 +
Ip2  
>s) 
    A1 
   
    B1 
  
B2 
 
A2 
     
( Iq1 < 1~q )  (  
Iq2  > 2~q ) 
( Ip2 > 2~p ) 
    B1 
  
    A1 
   
 
 
Then, the profit functions for the merged firm (A1-B1) and independent firms (A2 
and B2) are respectively given by 
ΠA1 –B1= sD11 + p1 D12 + q1 D21 
ΠA2 = p2 (D21 + D22) and ΠB2= q2 (D12 + D22) , where  
D11   = a –b s+ c (p1 + q2)+c (p2 + q1 )+ c (p2 + q2) 
D12  = a –b (p1 + q2)+ c s+ c (p2 + q2)+ c (p2 + q1) 
D21 = a –b (p2 + q1)+ c (p2 + q2)+ c s+ c (p1 + q2) 
D22 = a –b (p2 + q2)+ c (p2 + q1)+ c (p1 + q2) + c s  
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The merged firm’s profit, ΠA1 –B1, consists of three components: the profit from selling the 
bundle A1B1 ( sD11), the profit from selling stand-alone product A1 as part of the mix-and-
match system A1B2 (p1 D12), and the profit from selling stand-alone product B1 as part of the 
mix-and-match system A2B1 (q1 D21).  
The market equilibrium (Nash equilibrium prices) is characterized by the following 
first-order conditions: 
∂ΠA1 –B1/∂s   = a – 2 b s + 2c p1 + 2 c p2 + 2c q1 +2c q2 = 0 
∂ΠA1 –B1/∂ p1 = a + 2 c s – 2b p1 + 2 c p2 + 2c q1 – (b - c) q2 = 0 
∂ΠA1 –B1/∂ q1  = a + 2 c s + 2c p1 – (b - c) p2 – 2b q1 + 2c q2 = 0 
∂ΠA2/∂ p2 = 2a + 2 c s + 2c p1 – 4(b - c) p2 –  (b - c) q1 (b - 3c) q2 = 0 
∂ΠB2/∂ q2 = 2a + 2 c s – (b - c)  p1 – (b - 3c) p2 + 2 c q1 - 4(b - c) q2 = 0 
By taking advantage of the symmetry of the model, I can derive the equilibrium market 
prices as 1
~p  = 1~q = x, and 2~p  = 2~q =y, where x and y satisfy 
a – 2 b s + 4c (x+y) = 0 
a + 2 c s – 2(b – c) x – (b - 3c) y = 0 
2 a + 2 c s – (b - 3c) x – (5b  - 7c )y = 0 
Solving the equations above simultaneously yields: 
)493(2
)3(~
22 cbcb
cbas
+−
−
=    (the bundle price) 
1
~p  = 1~q  = 22 493 cbcb
ab
+−
  (stand-alone product price by the merged firm)
  
2
~p  = 2~q = 22 493
)(
cbcb
cba
+−
−   (independent firms’ component price) 
With the parameter restriction b>3c, I have the following result. 
 
Proposition 1. The model shows that mixed bundling following the merger would have the 
following implications for prices.  
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 First, the price of the bundle post-merger is lower than the sum of the pre-merger 
component prices (
)493(2
)3(~
22 cbcb
cbas
+−
−
=  < Iijs  =
I
ip +
I
jq = cb
a
73
2
−
).7 
 Second, the merged firm’s prices for individual components are higher with mixed 
bundling ( 1~p  = 1~q  = 22 493 cbcb
ab
+−
> Ip1 =
Iq1 = cb
a
73 −
) 
 Third, the independent firms also cut their prices ( 2~p  = 2~q = 22 493
)(
cbcb
cba
+−
−  
< Ip2 =
Iq2 = cb
a
73 −
). 
 
With the equilibrium prices derived for mixed bundling, I can calculate the changes in 
market shares and profits after the merger.   The demand for each system after the merger is 
given by: 
 D 11   = 2 2
(3 5 )
2(3 9 4 )
ab b c
b bc c
−
− +
 
D 12 = D 21 = 
2 2
2 2
(2 5 )
2(3 9 4 )
a b bc c
b bc c
− +
− +
 
D 22 =
2 2
2 2
(2 3 3 )
2(3 9 4 )
a b bc c
b bc c
− +
− +
  
The profits of the merged firm and outside firms are given by:  
Π A1-B1 = 
2 2 2
2 2 2
(17 38 9 )
4(3 9 4 )
a b b bc c
b bc c
− +
− +
 
Π A2  = Π B2  =
2 3
2 2 2
2 ( )
(3 9 4 )
a b c
b bc c
−
− +
 
 
                                                 
7 This can be easily proved with our assumption of the gross substitutability of the demand systems, that is,  
b>3c. 
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Proposition 2. Mixed bundling following the merger would have the following implications 
for market shares and profits.  
 First, the demands for the bundle (A1B1) and the system comprised of outside firms’ 
components (A2B2) increase at the expense of mix-and-match systems (A1B2  and 
A2B1 ).   Since the bundle price is lower than the sum of the outside firms’ component 
prices, the increase in the demand for the bundle is larger than that for   the outside 
system, that is, D 11 >  D 22 > (Dij) > D 12 = D 21.  
 
 Second, the derived demand for the components increases for the merging firms at 
the expense of the derived demand for outside firms ( D 11+ D 12 = D 11+ D 21 > D11 + 
D12 =D11 + D21 , D 21 + D 22 = D 12 + D 22 < D21 + D22 =D12 + D22). 
 
 Third, the merging firms’ profits increase at the expense of independent firms’ 
profits ( Π A1-B1 > ΠA1 + ΠB2 , Π A2  = Π B2  < ΠA2  = ΠB2 ). The merger would 
therefore reduce the profits of the merged firm’s competitors. This reduction in 
profits follows directly from the combination of a loss of market share and the need 
to cut prices. 8  
 
Example.  Consider the case where a=b=1 and c=1/4.   Then I can show that with the 
independent ownership (pre-merger) structure, Ip1 =
Ip2 =
Iq1 =
Iq2  =4/5.   The total price of 
each composite good is 8/5 and each firm gets the profits of 24/25.   
After the merger between A1 and B1, the merged entity (A1-B1) charges s =11/8 for 
the bundle and 1
~p  = 1~q  =1 for separate components.   Thus, it offers discount for the 
bundle (11/8 < 1+1=2).  Independent producers, A2 and B2, charge 2
~p  = 2~q  = ¾ for their 
component products.  Thus, the prices for composite products, A1B1, A1B2, A2B1, and A2B2 
                                                 
8 All results can be easily proved algebraically by simple manipulations with the assumption of b>3c, except 
the merging firms’ profit changes.   The Mathematica program, however, shows that the merging firms’ profits 
increase after the merger.  
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are given by 11/8, 7/4, 7/4, and 3/2, respectively, where 7/4>3/2>11/8.   After the merger 
A1-B1 receives the profits of 129/64 (>24/25+24/25), whereas independent producers get 
27/32 (<24/25).  This implies that A1 and B1 together increase their combined profits after 
merger while independent producers’ profits decrease.   
II.3. Welfare Analysis 
 I perform a welfare analysis of the effects of a merger in the absence of foreclosure.  
I take the sum of consumer and producer surplus as a measure of social welfare.  To derive 
the consumer surplus, I first invert the demand system to obtain inverse demand functions 
(that is, demand functions in which the price of a system is given as a function of sales 
volumes for all systems).    The inverse demand system can be written as:  
s11 (D11, D12, D21, D22) = (β+γ) a  – (β−2γ)D11– γ D12  – γ D21 – γ D22  
s12 (D11, D12, D21, D22) =  (β+γ) a  – γ D11– (β−2γ)D12 – γ D21 – γ D22  
s21 (D11, D12, D21, D22) = (β+γ) a  – γ D11– γ D12  –(β−2γ) D21 – γ D22  
s22 (D11, D12, D21, D22) = (β+γ) a  – γ D11– γ D12  – γ D21 – (β−2γ)D22 , 
where β= 
))(3( cbcb
b
+−
and γ=
))(3( cbcb
c
+−
. 
These inverse demand functions imply that the utility function is given by: 
U(D11, D12, D21, D22)  = (β+γ) a [D11 + D12 + D21 + D22] − 2
2γβ −  [ 211( )D + 212( )D + 
221( )D + 
222( )D ] – γ [ D11 D12 + D11 D21 + D11 D22 + D12 D21 + D12 D22 + D21 D22 ] 
Having calculated this utility function, it is possible to calculate total consumer valuations of 
the products purchased. 
In my linear model, the level of the demand intercept “a” has no effect on the relative 
prices.  Similarly, the parameters b and c only affect the results through the ratio of b/c.  I 
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thus normalize a = b =1 and analyze the effects of a merger on social welfare as I change the 
c parameter.  With the assumption of the gross substitutability of composite goods, the 
normalization of b=1 implies that c∈ (0, 1/3).  With these restrictions, I can calculate pre-
merger social welfare, W, and post-merger social welfare, W~ , as follows: 
W = 
)31()73(
)13185(2
2
2
cc
cc
−−
+− ,  W~ = 22
432
)493)(31(8
8842174145587
ccc
cccc
+−−
+−+−  
I plot the changes in social welfare due to the merger in Figure 3. 
222
5432
)493()37(8
32814713152227464863~
ccc
cccccWW
+−−
−+−+−
=−  
 
)13185()493(16
)8842174145587()73(~
222
4322
cccc
ccccc
W
W
+−+−
+−+−−
=  
 
Figure 3. Absolute Changes and the Ratio of Social Welfare due to a Merger 
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I emphasize that the above calculations assume there is no foreclosure due to the 
merger and the merging firm does not behave strategically with anticompetitive intent.  
Otherwise, the effects of a merger on social welfare would be decidedly negative.  For 
instance, suppose that there is a fixed cost of operation F that can be avoided by exiting the 
industry.  If I have a situation such that Π A2  = Π B2  < F <ΠA2  = ΠB2, a merger between A1 
and B1 will induce exit by the outsiders, and social welfare will be unambiguously affected 
in a negative way. 
Even in the absence of such foreclosure effects, there could be significant welfare 
loss when c (cross-substitutability parameter) is sufficiently large.  When c is close to zero, 
each system is essentially a separate product, and there is little direct competition between 
systems.  In this case, the structure of each system market is equivalent to the one 
considered by Cournot and mergers are welfare enhancing.   In cases with high degrees of 
substitutability and intense competition among systems (i.e., high c), however, the model 
suggests that the effects of mergers on social welfare are negative.   
 
III. The Effects of Mergers on the R&D Incentives Compatibility Decision 
  In the previous section, I have analyzed the effects of mergers on pricing assuming 
that the product characteristics and cost structures are given.  I now extend the basic 
framework laid out in section II to analyze the impact of mergers on R&D incentives and 
incentives to engage in pure bundling when technical tying is feasible as a result of the 
merger.  To this end, I consider a two-stage game in which price competition is preceded by 
R&D competition/ compatibility decision.   The basic model indicates that bundling (or 
incompatible product design) on the part of the merged firm reduces the future market 
available to independent rivals and consequently reduces their incentives to invest in cost 
reducing R&D.   The main intuition is that firms’ incentives to engage in R&D activities are 
proportional to their outputs in the product market since R&D costs are largely sunk (Choi, 
forthcoming).  Any reduction in the future market available will thus reduce expected future 
profits and current R&D spending.  The analysis of the incentives to bundle can also be 
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applied to the compatibility decision for the merged firm with the rest of the suppliers since 
pure bundling is the same as the choice of incompatibility in its economic effects.   
III.1. The Effects of Mergers (with Mixed Bundling) on R&D Incentives 
This subsection describes how the reduced output by independent firms due to the A1-B1 
merger will adversely affect independent firms’ R&D incentives.  
Let me denote A1, A2, B1, and B2’s marginal costs as α1, α 2, β1, and β 2, respectively.  
Let  γ = ( α1, α 2 , β1, β 2 ) be the vector of marginal costs.  Then I can represent each firm’s 
equilibrium profits in the pre-merger situation as: 
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where )(1 γp , )(2 γp , )(1 γq , and )(2 γq  are equilibrium prices for A1, A2, B1, and B2 when 
γ is  the industry cost structure.  
Prior to the merger between A1 and B1, the R&D incentives for A2 can be represented by: 
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The expression above yields the marginal benefit to A2 from decreasing its production cost 
and thus represents the R&D incentives for A2.   By the envelope theorem:  
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which is the equilibrium output level for A2 prior to innovation, and 
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Therefore, I can rewrite the expression for A2’s R&D incentives as: 
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I can interpret the term  (D21+D22) as the direct effects of innovation through cost saving and 
the second term:  
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as the indirect effects of innovation through price competition. 
After the A1-B1 merger, I can represent each firm’s equilibrium profits in the pre-merger 
situation as: 
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where )(~ γs is the bundle price, and other variables corresponding with the post merger 
situation are denoted with a tilde.   Then the post-merger expression for A2’s R&D 
incentives can be written as: 
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Once again, by the envelope theorem,  
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which is the post-merger equilibrium output level for A2 prior to innovation, and  
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Therefore, I can rewrite the expression for A2’s R&D incentives as: 
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Once again, I can interpret the first term −( 21~D + 22~D ) as the direct effects and the second 
term  
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as the indirect effects.   
If I compare the direct effects of innovation, A2 will unambiguously reduce R&D 
expenditures since its market output contracts after the A1-B1 merger; (D21+D22) 
> ( 21~D + 22~D ).  
In general, the indirect effects of innovation through price competition before and after the 
merger are not directly comparable.   However, if the merged firm responds more 
aggressively to other firms’ price cuts after the merger, I expect that: 
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is smaller than 
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. 
Then A2 will unambiguously reduce its R&D.   Even if the last inequality is reversed, if the 
direct effects of innovation are sufficiently large compared to the indirect effects, A2 will 
still reduce its R&D.    
 In the Appendix, I conduct a simulation analysis in which I confirm that the merged 
firm increases its R&D level whereas outside rival firms reduce their R&D levels in a linear 
demand model with quadratic R&D cost functions.  I also perform a dynamic welfare 
analysis and show that the effects of mergers can be especially harmful in industries with 
more R&D opportunities. 
 
III.2. Pure Bundling/Compatibility Choice and Foreclosure 
Until now, I have analyzed only the possibility of mixed bundling after a merger 
between complementary producers in which the merged firm sells the individual 
components separately as well as selling the bundle (but the bundle is offered at a discount 
to the sum of the stand-alone prices).  In this subsection, I consider another type of practice 
known as pure bundling, under which the firm only sells the bundle and does not make the 
individual components available individually.  For existing generations of products, it is a 
reasonable assumption that the merged firm’s ability to engage in pure bundling is limited 
since pure bundling is typically not an ex post optimal strategy for the merged firm, and thus 
it requires a commitment device. 9   
In the long run, however, the merged firm can commit to pure bundling in the form 
of technical tying, especially for new generations of products, by making its products 
available only as an integrated system, incompatible with the individual components offered 
by outside suppliers.  In such a case, the only available systems in the market are A1-B1 and 
                                                 
9  See Whinston (1990) for a classical analysis of pure bundling in which he shows the importance of 
commitment ability for bundling to have any impact on competition. 
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A2-B2 since A1 and B1 will only function effectively as part of the bundled system and 
cannot be used alongside components from other suppliers.  By inverting the inverse 
demand system in section II.3 with the constraint D12 = D21 = 0, I can derive the following 
demand system: 
D11(s, p2, q2 )  =
( )
( )
b c
b c
+
−
2 2[ ( 2 )( ) ]a b c p q cs− − + +   
D22(s, p2, q2 )  =
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( )
b c
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+
−
2 2[ ( 2 )( ) ]a b c p q cs− − + + ,  
where s = the merged firm’s price for system A1-B1 , 2p = the price of A2 and 
2q =the price of B2. 
 
Then the profit functions for the merged firm (A1-B1) and independent firms (A2 and B2) 
with pure bundling are respectively given by 
ΠA1 –B1= sD11 , ΠA2 = p2  D22 and ΠB2= q2 D22   
The market equilibrium (Nash equilibrium prices) is characterized by the following first-
order conditions:∂ΠA1 –B1/∂s   = 0,∂ΠA2/∂ p2 = 0, and∂ΠB2/∂ q2 = 0.    Solving the conditions 
simultaneously yields:  
2 2
(3 4 )
2(3 12 11 )
a b cs
b bc c
−
=
− +
   (the bundle price) 
  
2p  = 2q = 2 2
(2 3 )
2(3 12 11 )
a b c
b bc c
−
− +
 (independent firms’ component price) 
 
As in the case of mixed bundling, the bundle price offered by the merged firm is lower than 
the sum of independent firms’ component prices. As a result, the merged firm dominates the 
outside firms in terms of market share. 
I conduct a numerical analysis to investigate the profitability of mergering with pure 
bundling.   Once again, I normalize parameters with a=b=1.   With this normalization, the 
effects of a merger with pure bundling on the merging and outside firms’ profits are plotted 
in Figures 4 and 5. 
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Figure 4. Changes in Profits for the Merging Firms with Pure Bundling 
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Π = post-merger profits for outsiders with pure bundling 
 2AΠ , 2BΠ = pre-merger profits for firms A2 and B2, respectively  
Figure 5. Changes in Profits for the Outsiders with Pure Bundling 
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Thus, the merger with pure bundling is profitable for merging firms A1 and B1.  However, 
pure bundling is less profitable than mixed bundling for the merged entity as shown in 
Figure 6.  
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Figure 6. Mergers with Pure Bundling vs. Mixed Bundling 
 
I can thus conclude that the merged firm will not practice pure bundling since mixed 
bundling yields higher profits as an accommodation strategy.  However, as in Whinston 
(1990), pure bundling can be still profitable if the exclusion of rivals through predation is 
possible with pure bundling, but not with mixed bundling.  This may occur because 
outsiders’ profits are affected more adversely with pure bundling.  To see this, I  plot the 
differences in outsiders’ profits with pure bundling and mixed bundling in Figure 7.10    
Thus, I can imagine a situation where there is a fixed cost of operation and rival 
firms can recoup fixed costs with mixed bundling but not with pure bundling, that is, 
                                                 
10 For the sake of brevity, I report only the effects of pure bundling with price competition.  However, similar 
results can be derived when we introduce the possibility of R&D competition in the model.   
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Π .   In such a case, the merged firm can foreclose rival firms 
by committing to pure bundling with technical tying.   One way to accomplish such a 
commitment is by designing new generations of products that are incompatible with those of 
rival firms. 
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Figure 7. Pure Bundling vs. Mixed Bundling for Outsiders’ Profits 
 
I considered only the case of duopolistic competition in each component market.   
When there are many outside independent firms, the possibility of full foreclosure of all 
independent suppliers seems to be remote.  However, if one of the smaller firms chooses not 
to compete in certain segments of the complementary market, it could potentially have a 
ripple effect in terms of threatening the viability of other independent firms in the 
complementary segments.  
IV. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I provided a framework to analyze the effects of a merger in systems 
markets when the merger enables the merging parties to engage in mixed bundling.   As 
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such, it can shed some light on merger/divestiture issues in network industries such as 
“portfolio effects” or “range effects.”  The model, for instance, can be applied to the recent 
proposed merger between GE and Honeywell.  When the European Commission blocked 
the proposed merger, the decision was heavily, and in my opinion unfairly, criticized in the 
popular press and by the U.S. antitrust agencies and senior administration officials, raising 
fears of escalating trade disputes between the US and EU.11  In particular, there have been 
some unfortunate suggestions in the newspapers that the decision was made without any 
theoretical support.12  This paper, in contrast, shows that the effects of bundling can be 
analyzed with sound economic modeling.   
My model suggests that mergers with bundling in systems markets could entail both 
pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects.  In the event of any foreclosure of competitors, 
however, conglomerate mergers with mixed bundling would be predominantly anti-
competitive.  Even in the absence of such foreclosure effects, there is no clear-cut answer to 
how mixed bundling by the merging parties would affect consumer and social welfare.  
With heterogeneous consumer preferences, some buyers gain and others lose.  For instance, 
those who previously purchased both products from the two merging firms would gain due 
to the lower bundle price.   However, those who continue to purchase a mix-and-match 
system would suffer due to the increased stand-alone prices charged by the merged firm.  As 
a result, the overall impact on consumer and social welfare is ambiguous.  In general, 
conglomerate mergers would have different implications for competition depending on 
specific market conditions such as market shares of the merging parties in their individual 
markets, economies of scale due to avoidable fixed costs, ease of entry, etc.  To sort out pro-
competitive effects and anti-competitive effects of each conglomerate merger case, the 
relative magnitudes of these countervailing effects and the likelihood of the foreclosure of 
                                                 
11 See, for instance, the address by William J. Kolasky (2001), Deputy Assistant Attorney General for 
International Affairs in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.   
12 Interestingly enough, the EC’s bundling theory was described as “19th-century thinking” in the New York 
Times whereas it was described as “novel” in the Wall Street Journal.   See Hal R. Varian, Economic Scene; In 
Europe, GE and Honeywell ran afoul of 19th-century thinking.," N.Y. Times, June 28, 2001 and Editorial, 
Europe to GE: Go Home, Wall Street J., June 15, 2001.  
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one or more competitors need to be assessed.  Blanket approvals of conglomerate mergers 
with the presumption that bundling is either pro-competitive or competitively neutral are 
certainly not warranted.   
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Appendix.  The Effects of Merger with Mixed Bundling on R&D Incentives 
 
In this appendix, I conduct a simulation analysis on the effects of mergers on R&D 
incentives and welfare implications in a linear demand model with a quadratic R&D cost 
function.  For the sake of presentation, I consider R&D that improves the quality of 
components and shifts the system demand curves outward.  More precisely, let ( 1∆ , 2∆ , 
1δ , 2δ ) denote quality improvements of components A1, A2, B1, B2, respectively, which 
represent consumers’ willingness to pay for the systems that contain them.  For instance, 
consumers’ willingness to pay for the system AiBj increases by i∆  + jδ .  Let me assume 
that the cost of improving the quality of each component is given by k 2∆ /2, where ∆ is the 
amount of quality improvement and k is an R&D cost parameter. 
The inverse demand system can be written as:  
s11 (D11, D12, D21, D22) = (β+γ) a  + ( 1∆ + 1δ ) – (β−2γ)D11– γ D12  – γ D21 – γ D22  
s12 (D11, D12, D21, D22) =  (β+γ) a  + ( 1∆ + 2δ )  – γ D11– (β−2γ)D12 – γ D21 – γ D22  
s21 (D11, D12, D21, D22) = (β+γ) a  + ( 2∆ + 1δ )  – γ D11– γ D12  –(β−2γ) D21 – γ D22  
s22 (D11, D12, D21, D22) = (β+γ) a  + ( 2∆ + 2δ )– γ D11– γ D12  – γ D21 – (β−2γ)D22 , 
where β= 
))(3( cbcb
b
+−
and γ=
))(3( cbcb
c
+−
. 
Then, the inverse demand system implies the following system demand functions given 
( 1∆ , 2∆ , 1δ , 2δ ): 
D11   = a + (b−c) ( 1∆ + 1δ ) –2c( 2∆ + 2δ ) –b (p1 + q1 )+ c (p1 + q2 )+c (p2 + q1 )+ c (p2 + q2 ) 
D12  = a + (b−c) ( 1∆ + 2δ ) –2c( 2∆ + 1δ ) –b (p1 + q2 )+ c (p1 + q1 )+ c (p2 + q2 )+ c (p2 + q1 ) 
D21 = a + (b−c) ( 2∆ + 1δ ) –2c( 1∆ + 2δ ) –b (p2 + q1 )+ c (p2 + q2 )+ c (p1 + q1 )+  c (p1 + q2 ) 
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D22 = a + (b−c) ( 2∆ + 2δ ) –2c( 1∆ + 1δ )–b (p2 + q2 )+ c (p2 + q1 )+ c (p1 + q2 ) + c (p1 + q1 )  
For a simulation analysis, let me normalize the parameters to a=b=1.  Then, Figures 
A-1 and A-2 show the changes in profits due to the A1-B1 merger for the merging firms (A1 
and B1) and outsider firms (A2 and B2) for parameter values k ∈[20,100] and c∈ [0,1/3].  
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Figure A-1. Changes in Profits for the Merging Firms with R&D 
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Figure A-2. Changes in Profits for the Outsider Firms with R&D 
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Our simulation results suggest that for wide ranges of parameter spaces, the merger is 
profitable for A1 and B1 whereas it reduces the outsider firms’ profits.   Welfare implications 
of the merger in the presence of R&D are represented in Figure A-3.  
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Figure A-2. Changes in Welfare due to Mergers in the Presence of R&D 
As in the case without R&D, simulation results suggest that welfare results are 
ambiguous and depend crucially on c (cross-substitutability parameter).  Once again, when c 
is close to zero, each system is essentially a separate product and there is little direct 
competition between systems.  In this case, the structure of each system market is equivalent 
to the one considered by Cournot and the merger is welfare enhancing.   In cases with high 
degrees of substitutability and intense competition among systems, the effects of mergers on 
social welfare are negative.    
To investigate the effects of the R&D cost parameter, I also plot the changes in 
welfare due to mergers with three different values of k in Figure A-3.   The results suggest 
that mergers are more likely to reduce welfare when there are more opportunities for cost 
reduction through R&D, that is, when k is lower. 
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Figure A-3. The Effects of R&D Opportunities on Changes in Welfare due to Mergers  
